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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
"ROBO-SIGNING": A SYMPTOM OF THE
SHORTCOMINGS IN MARYLAND'S POLICY OF
EXPEDITING FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
Jacob L. White
INTRODUCTION
The foreclosure process in the United States has recently ground to
a halt.' Unfortunately, this delay has not been brought on by gains in
the depressed U.S. housing market.' Instead, a backlog of foreclosure
filings has amassed, which stand to further delay the recovery of the
real estate market.' The parties responsible for this backlog of foreclo-
sures are mortgage servicers, who incurred governmental scrutiny af-
ter their robo-signing practices came to light.'
Robo-signing' drew the national spotlight late last year,' as officials
from several mortgage servicing companies admitted to signing
1. The number of foreclosure filings in United States "dropped 35 percent
last month to the lowest level in almost four years." Dan Levy, Foreclosure
Filings in U.S. Plunge to Lowest in Four Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/foreclosure-filings-in-us-plunge-
35percent-to-lowest-in-fouryears/2011/08/11/gIQAlqBL8I-story.html.
2. Id. Rather it is a product of "increased efforts to keep delinquent borrow-
ers in their homes." Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Unfortunately, robo-signing cannot be pigeon-holed as a monolithic phe-
nomenon. As explained in aJuly 18, 2011 article from the Associated Press:
Robo-signing refers to a variety of practices. It can mean a qualified
executive in the mortgage industry signs a mortgage affidavit docu-
ment without verifying the information. It can mean someone
forges an executive's signature, or a lower-level employee signs his
or her own name with a fake title. It can mean failing to comply
with notary procedures. In all of these cases, robo-signing involves
people signing documents and swearing to their accuracy without
verifying any of the information.
Michelle Conlin & Pallavi Gogoi, Mortgage 'Robo-Signing' Goes On, Associ-
ATED PRESs (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/
wirestory?id=14100463.
6. Matt Gutman & Bradley Blackburn, Foreclosure Crisis: 23 States Halt Foreclo-
sure As Officials Review Bank Practices, ABC NEws (Oct. 4, 2010), http://abc
news.go.com/WN/robo-signers-blamed-foreclosure-mistakes/
story?id=1 1798650.
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thousands of affidavits attesting to the accuracy of foreclosure docu-
ments without actual knowledge of their validity.' In the wake of these
revelations, federal and state agencies, attorneys general, state legisla-
tures, state judiciaries, and lending institutions have all taken mea-
sures to ensure that proper procedures were being followed with
regard to foreclosure filings.' Nevertheless, the concern remains that
the uncertainty surrounding servicers' robo-signing of foreclosure
documents "will extend the current housing market woes into 2012
and beyond."9
In order to avoid this type of foreclosure backlog, and to promote
judicial efficiency and liquidity in the real estate market, Maryland of-
ficials have traditionally espoused a strong policy of expediting fore-
closure proceedings."o However, in light of recent realizations of the
widespread use of robo-signing by mortgage servicers, one must ques-
tion the efficacy of maintaining a policy that emphasizes speed in an
atmosphere wrought with fraud. This article asks whether Maryland
lawmakers should continue the policy of expediting foreclosure pro-
ceedings, and ultimately argues that recent revelations of robo-signing
suggest that the policy has gone too far because of (1) cursory judicial
oversight of the foreclosure process, (2) a problematic organizational
structure in the mortgage servicing industry, and (3) a lack of per-
sonal responsibility on the part of individual actors." Thus, in order
to permanently eliminate robo-signing, Maryland lawmakers must
7. See, e.g., Matthew B. Banks, Note, Prima Facie Validity of Proofs of Claim in the
Age of "Robo-Signers", 29-JAN Ama. BANKR. INST. J. 54, 55 (2011) ("GMAC em-
ployee Jeffrey Stephan admitted during a deposition that he was signing
nearly 10,000 foreclosure documents a month without the requisite first-
hand knowledge."). See also Ariana Eunjung Cha, Ally's GMAC Mortgage Unit
Temporarily Halts Evictions in 23 States, WASH. POST. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://
voices.washingtonpost.com/political-economy/2010/09/allysgmac_mort-
gage-unithalts.html (" [An] employee of Ally Financial[, who] may have
approved tens of thousands of foreclosures across the country . . . stated
that when he put his signature on case files, he did not know what informa-
tion the file contained. . .").
8. See generally Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle, WASH. POST, 2011, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/foreclosure-freeze/tineline.html (offer-
ing a number of examples of lending institutions announcing foreclosure
freezes, and also both federal and state level governmental units con-
ducting investigations into flawed foreclosure procedures, between Septem-
ber 20th and November 18th, 2010).
9. Levy, supra note 1 (quoting RealtyTrac Chief Executive Officer James J.
Saccacio).
10. See, e.g., Bacharach v. Washington United Coop., Inc., 29 A.2d 822, 825
(Md. 1943) ("The purpose of [the Maryland Mortgage Act] was to provide
a more expeditious, and less expensive, method of enforcing mortgages
than the former proceeding by formal bill in equity. . .").
11. See Lauren E. Willis, Developments in the Law: The Home Mortgage Crisis: Intro-
duction: Why Didn't the Courts Stop the Mortgage Crisis?, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1195, 1203 (2010) (explaining that one of the reasons that U.S. courts
failed to stop or slow down the mortgage crisis is the fact "that most courts
rubber-stamp foreclosures").
consider a solution that takes into account all of these facets of the
problem.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Introduction to the Foreclosure Process
Normally, whenever an individual secures a loan for the purchase of
real property, the lender will require that the individual execute a
mortgage on the property as collateral for the loan." If the mortgagor
defaults on the loan by failing to repay the amount set forth in the
promissory note in a timely manner, the mortgagee may foreclose on
the property.'3 Foreclosure proceedings are generally governed by
state law." Nineteen states require lenders to institute judicial pro-
ceedings in order to foreclose on a home." On the other hand, three
states employ hybrid formulations of the foreclosure process, and
twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia allow foreclosures to
occur without the need for formal judicial proceedings.'"
In Maryland, which is a non-judicial foreclosure state,' mortgage
documents may contain a "power of sale" clause.'" In the event of the
mortgagor's default, this clause allows the mortgagee, after initially
filing an order to docket," to sell the property to recover the amount
owed in the note without instituting judicial proceedings, subject only
to ratification by the court.20 However, if the mortgage document
lacks a power of sale clause, the mortgagee must initiate judicial pro-
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 Cmt. (1997)
("The function of a mortgage is to employ an interest in real estate as secur-
ity for the performance of some obligation."). What is referred to colloqui-
ally as a "mortgage" is actually two separate documents: (1) the promissory
note, which is the borrower's agreement to repay the loan plus interest on
the dates and at the times specified in the note; and (2) the mortgage or
deed of trust, which is the borrower's agreement to pledge the property as
collateral in order to secure payment of the note. See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997) ("A mortgage is a convey-
ance or retention of an interest in real property as security for performance
of an obligation.").
13. Id.
14. David R. Greenberg, Comment, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage Assign-
ment Process and the Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L.
REv. 253, 261 (2010).
15. Foreclosure Laws and Procedures by State, REALTYTRAc, http://www.realty
trac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp (last visited
Oct. 24, 2011).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105(b)(2) (2011) ("A power of sale or as-
sent to decree authorized in a mortgage or deed of trust may be exercised
only by an individual.").
19. MD. R. 14-207(a)(1) (2010).
20. MD. R. 14-207(a) (2) ("An action to foreclose a lien pursuant to an assent to
a decree or pursuant to a lien instrument that contains neither a power of
sale nor an assent to a decree shall be commenced by filing a complaint to
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ceedings in order to foreclose on the property.2 1 It is significant that
both processes require that a plaintiff provide notice to the home-
owner as to the total sales price of the residence, the total considered
to be given or received, the time at which title is to be sold, and other
financial and legal obligations."
B. Maryland's Policy of Expediting Foreclosure Proceedings
As early as 1943, in Bacharach v. Washington United Cooperative, Inc.,
the Maryland Court of Appeals articulated its position that the Mary-
land Mortgage Act, which authorized the use of power of sale clauses
to foreclose by mortgagees, was enacted "to provide a more expedi-
tious, and less expensive, method of enforcing mortgages."2 3 In Ba-
charach, the Court of Appeals held that where the plaintiff "did not
allege specific charges of fraud," the foreclosure sale of the property
in question, which was performed under a power of sale clause and
was subsequently ratified by the court, should not have been set
aside.24 The court explained that mere "harmless errors or irregulari-
ties," were not enough, rather, there must be "substantial grounds tojustify a court in setting aside a judicial sale."" Underlying this rule,
the court articulated a policy of judicial efficiency, which is the basis
for the court's "presum[ption] that the mortgagee . . . has discharged
his duty faithfully in the exercise of the power of sale," and that the
rationale for placing the burden of proof is on the party challenging
the foreclosure sale." However, the court stressed that this policy was
not intended "to impair or defeat the right of the mortgagor to be
heard in defense of his property.""
More recently, in G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Levenson, the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed their policy of expediting foreclosure
proceedings in their reversal of a Court of Special Appeals' ruling that
would have required a party foreclosing based on an equitably subro-
gated lien to obtain a declaratory judgment before foreclosing pursu-
ant to a power of sale clause." In doing so, the court strongly
reiterated its understanding that the "policy of Maryland law [is] to
expedite mortgage foreclosures.""
foreclose. If the lien instrument contains an assent to a decree, no process
shall issue . .
21. Id.
22. 15 M.L.E. Mortgages § 128 (2011).
23. Bacharach v. Washington United Coop., Inc., 29 A.2d 822, 824-25 (Md.
1943) (statement of Judge Bryan).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 825.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 657 A.2d 1170, 1178 (Md.
1995).
29. Id.
Nevertheless, the court cited Maryland's foreclosure policy again in
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Neal. However, in that case, rather
than allowing the foreclosure to go forward, the court instead held
that a mortgagee's failure to comply with U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") loss mitigation regulations alluded
to in its Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") insured mortgage
was evidence of "unclean hands" on the part of the mortgagee, which
would be sufficient for the court to grant an injunction staying the
foreclosure under Maryland Rule 14-209."1
C. The Origins of Robo-Signing
The current robo-signing issue can be traced back to the subprime
mortgage crisis of the mid-2000s.12 During the period leading up to
the subprime mortgage crisis, the percentage of new mortgages in the
U.S., which were considered subprime," had quadrupled,34 largely
due to the growing demand for mortgage-backed securities." In 1994,
in order to accommodate the securitization process, the mortgage in-
dustry created a nationwide recording system, known as Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS")," under which com-
panies were able to sidestep the requirement that mortgages be re-
recorded in county land records offices every time they were sold."
30. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Neal, 922 A.2d 538, 550 (Md. 2007).
31. Id. at 551-52.
32. Pallavi Gogoi, Robo-Signing Practices Older, More Pervasive Than First
Thought, HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 1, 2011, 8:50 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/01/robo-signing-practices-1990s-n_945867.
html.
33. Subprime mortgages are loans which banks market to individuals who typi-
cally could not qualify for loans in the "prime market[,]" due to factors
such as "poor credit history, . . . limited assets, self-employment, and varia-
ble income." Greenberg, supra note 14, at 255-56. Furthermore, subprime
mortgages typically begin "with a low interest rate[, that] ... [a]fter the first
two or three years ... increase [s] significantly, often to above-market rates."
Greenberg, supra note 14. These factors meant that there was a considera-
bly higher risk that the mortgagors would default on their debt, "thereby
making subprime mortgages a riskier investment for banks." Greenberg,
supra note 14. However, the securitization process allowed mortgage ser-
vicers to dilute this risk by passing it on to investors while continuing to
turn a profit from servicing fees. Greenberg, supra note 14.
34. See Greenburg supra note 14, at 255 ("Between 1994 and 2006, subprime
mortgages grew from five percent to over twenty percent of all new
mortgages.").
35. Greenburg supra note 14, at 256 ("Securitization of the subprime mortgage
market was a significant contributing factor in the rapid increase in sub-
prime lending.").
36. Yasha Levine, How an Obscure Outfit Called MERS is Subverting Our Entire Sys-
tem of Property Rights, ALTERNET (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/
story/1 49189/?page=entire.
37. Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic Registra-
tion Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 CARDOzo L. REv.
1621, 1621-22 (2011).
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With the creation of MERS, when a lender records a new mortgage
in the records office, "instead of listing [themselves] as the owner of
the mortgage, the lender names MERS as mortgagee, but 'solely as
nominee' - meaning only as an agent - for the lender, and for the
lender's 'successors and assigns.'"" Then, if the lender later assigns
that mortgage to another member of MERS, "the assignment need
not be recorded because the new owner is among the original
lender's 'successors and assigns."' 3 9 Since the vast majority of both
prime and subprime mortgages underwent securitization,40 and mort-
gages changed hands multiple times, it eventually became difficult to
determine who actually owned individual mortgages. 41
When the housing market declined, the U.S. was hit with millions of
foreclosures.4 2 Due to the complexities of the securitization process
coupled with widespread shoddy record-keeping practices in the mort-
gage industry,43 obtaining proper mortgage documents began to pre-
sent a problem for lenders attempting to foreclose, resulting in the
widespread filing of unverified and fraudulent documents, in other
words, robo-signing. 4
38. Id. at 1622.
39. Id. at 1623.
40. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 256 ("By 2006, 80.5% of all subprime loans
were packaged into mortgage-backed securities.").
41. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 257-58. The process normally works as follows:
(1) a mortgage broker issues a subprime loan to a traditionally "risky" mort-
gagor in exchange for a mortgage on their property; (2) the mortgage bro-
ker would then sell the mortgage to "an issuer or arranger"; (3) the issuer
then "pools thousands of mortgages together and sells them as securities
to . . . investors[, who each] . . . [receive] a fractional interest . . . [in a]
trust's pool of mortgages." Greenberg, supra note 14.
42. See Willis, supra note 11, at 1195 ("Roughly 6.4 million home foreclosures
were initiated between 2007 and 2009 . . . ."). See also ScotJ. Paltrow, Special
report: Banks Continue Robo-Signing, REUTERS (July 18, 2011), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/18/us-foreclosure-banks-idUS
TRE76H5XX20110718 ("In 2010, 2.5 million foreclosures were
initiated . . .").
43. See Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/mort-
gage-electronic registration.systemsinc/index.html ("In the fall of 2010,
as evidence mounted that many foreclosures may have been mishandled,
the system was faulted for sloppiness and questions were raised about
whether it was used to sidestep legal requirements.").
44. See Paul Kiel, Internal Doc Reveals GMAC Filed False Document in Bid to Foreclose,
PROPUBLICA (July 27, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/gmac-
mortgage-whistleblower-foreclosure (providing one example of how a mort-
gage servicing company, lacking proper documentation to foreclose, re-
sorted to filing a fraudulent document).
D. Immediate Reactions to and Consequences of the Robo-Signing Crisis
Private groups and governments, at the state and local levels, have
reacted to the emerging crisis.45 Ally Financial, Inc. was the first of a
number of companies to halt foreclosures as a result of revelations of
robo-signing.4 6 At the state level, attorneys general from across the
country have taken notice of the problems presented by robo-signing,
and have taken varying levels of action." Also, all fifty attorneys gen-
eral have announced that they are conducting a cooperative inquiry
into the mortgage servicing industry.4 8 State-level judicial systems have
reacted by adopting stricter filing requirements and exercising greater
scrutiny of documents in the foreclosure process.4 9 At the federal
level, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Re-
serve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision reached a settlement with
some of the largest banks, in which the banks agreed "to compensate
borrowers who were wrongly foreclosed upon and to overhaul their
operations[, but leaving the] [fWines . . . to be determined later."o5
The recent drop in foreclosure filings, which fell "to the lowest level
in almost four years," are representative of a delay that will likely ex-
tend the economic rut that the U.S. housing market is experiencing
through at least 2012.51 Also, recent reports claiming that banks have
continued to robo-sign5 2 signal that this backlog of foreclosures may
last significantly longer, as officials will be forced to further scrutinize
45. For a number of reactions to the robo-signing crisis by both private groups
and government see Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle, supra note 8.
46. Debra Cassens Weiss, How 2 Pro-Bono Lawyers Uncovered 'Robo-Signer,'Halting
Foreclosures in 23 States, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/how_2_pro-bono_1awyers-uncovered-robo-signer halt-
ing-foreclosures-in_23_sta/. Other banks which followed suit includedJ.P.
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, PNC Bank, and Goldman Sachs. Bank of
America has since announced that it would resume foreclosures as normal.
See Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle, supra note 8.
47. Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle, supra note 8. On September 20, 2010, Califor-
nia's Attorney General ordered Ally Financial to freeze all foreclosures
within the state. Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle, supra note 8. On October 6,
Ohio's Attorney General became the first to file a lawsuit against Ally Finan-
cial, alleging fraud in foreclosures across Ohio. Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle,
supra note 8.
48. Timeline: Foreclosure Debacle, supra note 8.
49. See ALAN M. WILNER, MD. CT. OF APP. COMM. ON RULES & PRACTICE, 166TH
REP., at 1 (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/
docs/166threport.pdf (proposing the adoption of Rule 14-207.1 and the
amending of Rules 1-311 and 14-207 in light of "recent revelations regard-
ing the filing in residential foreclosure actions."). See also, e.g., N.J. CT. R.
1:5-6 (West 2011) (amended 2011).
50. John W. Schoen, Mortgage Lenders Settle But Still Face Probe, MSNBC (Apr. 13,
2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42577451/ns/business-eye-on-
theeconomy/.
51. Levy, supra note 1.
52. Paltrow, supra note 42.
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foreclosure filings, adding further delay to the recovery of the U.S.
housing market.
II. ANALYSIS
Traditionally, Maryland courts have espoused a strong policy in
favor of expediting mortgage proceedings." Likewise, the widespread
practice of robo-signing has its basis in the mortgage industry's obses-
sion with efficiency." However, in light of the crisis at hand, one is
forced to question whether maintaining the current policy, which em-
phasizes speed, is still viable in an atmosphere wrought with fraud.
This article argues that robo-signing is evidence that the policy of ex-
pediting mortgage proceedings has gone too far, due to (1) cursory
judicial oversight of the foreclosure process, (2) a problematic organi-
zational structure within the mortgage servicing industry, and (3) a
lack of personal responsibility on the part of individual actors.
Therefore, any attempt to eliminate robo-signing must address each
of these elements of the problem. While one may contend that
greater regulation will delay the processing of current foreclosures,
and thus possibly add further delay to the recovery of the housing
market,56 such delay is necessary to rid the industry of an organiza-
tional culture which emphasizes expediency and profit over compli-
ance with the relevant statutory provisions.
53. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 28.
54. Banks, supra note 7, at 55 ("In today's climate, automation is the key to
efficiency. However, efficiency in the mortgage-service industry has led to
robo-signing, a lack of human interaction and due diligence . . . .").
55. See Willis, supra note 11, at 1197 (explaining that one of the reasons that
U.S. Courts failed to stop or slow down the mortgage crisis is the fact "that
most courts rubber-stamp foreclosures"). See also Andrew J. Kazakes, Com-
ment, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Cri-
sis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1383,
1393 (2010) ("[T]he structural characteristics of mortgage securitization
and foreclosure create incentives for mortgage servicers to prefer foreclo-
sure . . . ."), and Victoria V. Corder, Homeowners and Bondholders as Unlikely
Allies: Allocating the Costs of Securitization in Foreclosure, 30 BANKING & FIN.
SERVS. POL'Y REP., no. 5, 2011, at 19, 23 ("[A]t least one bankruptcy court
in Massachusetts has invoked its power . .. to sanction a plaintiff where the
court had evidence that the plaintiff was not the holder of the note but had
misrepresented itself as the holder to the court.").
56. See Levy, supra note 1.
57. See Kazakes, supra note 55, at 1400 ("Foreclosing parties-generally ser-
vicers-routinely file incomplete or unreviewed legal documents with
courts, while borrowers and their advocates often struggle with those same
servicers to obtain loan documents crucial to foreclosure defense. Under-
staffed to minimize overhead, servicers . .. are generally uncooperative with
borrower requests. . . .").
"Robo-Signing"
A. Cursory judicial Oversight of the Foreclosure Process
Courts throughout the U.S. have traditionally approved foreclo-
sures without a great degree of scrutiny." The Maryland judiciary has
been an adherent of this tradition, as evidenced by its procedures
which place the burden on the party opposing the foreclosure5 9 in the
interest of promoting judicial efficiency." However, robo-signing
presents a unique challenge to this policy in non-judicial foreclosure
states such as Maryland, since the majority of foreclosures are done
pursuant to power of sale clauses, which "[do] not involve any hear-
ings prior to, or meaningful judicial supervision of, the sale."6' As a
result, Maryland is especially susceptible to robo-signing, as it threat-
ens courts' reliance on affidavits submitted by the foreclosing party,
many of which are now known to have been fraudulent.
In response to the prevalence of robo-signing, the Maryland Court
of Appeals' Standing Committee on Rules and Practice reported to
the Court of Appeals that "the use of bogus affidavits to support ac-
tions to foreclose liens on property, apart from [being a] prejudice
to . . . homeowners, constitutes an assault on the integrity of the judicial
process itself"6 The Committee proposed three amendments to the
Maryland Rules aimed at rooting out robo-signing,6' by enhancing ju-
dicial oversight of the foreclosure process.6 6 Maryland Rule 14-207.1
strengthens the judicial screening process by allowing Maryland
courts to issue a "show cause order," which requires that a party who
submitted an affidavit that the court reasonably believes is somehow
deficient "show cause [as to] why the affidavit should not be stricken,
and if it is stricken, why the action should not be dismissed or other
relief granted."6 7 Furthermore, the Rule allows courts to appoint Ma-
ryland attorneys as "special master[s]", who "screen pleadings and pa-
pers" and provide the court with suitable recommendations." Lastly,
58. See Willis, supra note 11, at 1203 ("[M]ost courts rubber-stamp
foreclosures.").
59. See MD. R. 14-305 (1997). For example, the Maryland procedure for ratify-
ing a sale after a foreclosure states "that the sale will be ratified unless cause
to the contrary is shown within thirty days after the date of the notice." Id.
60. See, e.g., Bacharach v. Washington United Coop., Inc., 29 A.2d 822, 825
(Md. 1943).
61. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Neal, 922 A.2d 538, 550 (Md. 2007).
62. See Mn. R. 14-207(b) (2010).
63. See Banks, supra note 7.
64. Wilner, supra note 49, at 2 (emphasis added).
65. See Wilner, supra note 49. These amendments were ultimately adopted by
the Court of Appeals on October 20, 2010. See MD. RULES ORDER (Oct. 20,
2010), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/rodocs/rol66.pdf
(adopting MD. R. 14-207.1, and amending MD. R. 1-311 & MD. R. 14-207).
66. See Wilner, supra note 49, at 2 ("This approach ... addresses directly the
problem that has surfaced - assuring that these cases may proceed only
upon documents that are, in fact, genuine and valid.").
67. MD. R. 14-207.1 (2010).
68. Id.
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the Rule prevents the costs associated with the screening process from
being assessed against the borrower, unless they were the party prof-
fering the document." Other states have taken similar steps to assure
the validity of documents submitted during the foreclosure process.
However, more is likely needed to stem the tide of robo-signing,
because as previously noted, recent reports show that servicers con-
tinue to engage in the practice.7' In order to correct this problem,
Maryland courts may consider raising the degree of showing required
by the party attempting to foreclose on a home, and also by requiring
a further showing by the foreclosing party prior to the ratification of
the sale.
B. A Problematic Organizational Structure within the Mortgage Servicing
Industry
Another factor that led to the advent of robo-signing, and thus re-
vealed that the policy of expediting foreclosure proceedings has gone
too far, was the organization of the mortgage servicing industry it-
self.72 Since the policy of expediting foreclosure proceedings did not
sufficiently scrutinize foreclosure documents, the mortgage servicing
industry was free to push their practices consistently further towards
maximizing profits, without worrying about complying with the rele-
vant regulations." Thus, in order to permanently eliminate robo-sign-
ing, reform must extend to the organizational structure of the
industry from which the problems arose.74 The servicing industry is
organized in a fashion that emphasizes expediency and profit-max-
imization over compliance with applicable regulations." This is evi-
denced by the fact that mortgage servicers are generally
"[u]nderstaffed to minimize overhead,"" as well as "incentiv[ized]...
to prefer foreclosures[,]" 7 since their profit is generally derived from
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Washington Mut. Bank v. Phillip, No. 16359/08, 2010 WL 4813782,
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 2010) (granting plaintiff leave to correct defi-
ciencies in an affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of documents submitted
to the court, as required by an October 20, 2010 Administrative Order).
71. Paltrow, supra note 42.
72. See generally Andrew J. Kazakes, Comment, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in
Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State
Court Responses, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rxv. 1383, 1404 (2010) (explaining that the
organization and procedures of the mortgage servicing industry create in-
centives for servicers to foreclose on homeowners, and do so quickly, as
they must front legal fees; in other words, they have an incentive to robo-
sign and fabricate essential documents when originals are unavailable).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1391-92 (referring to the incentives to foreclose created by the struc-
ture of the mortgage industry and also to the "'chain of plausible
deniability"' that shields brokers from liability).
76. Id. at 1400.
77. Id. at 1391.
"collect[ing] late fees and servicing charges."" In addition, instituting
foreclosure proceedings allows servicers to "[recoup] fees and cash
outlays immediately."7 9 Also, mortgage servicers are incentivized to ex-
pedite the foreclosure process once it has begun, as they generally
"must front legal fees and borrower payments to investors."o
This organizational structure juxtaposes the best interests of home-
owners, investors, and servicers, creating a basis for robo-signing.8
First, servicers profit from pushing as many mortgagors as possible
into foreclosure, which undoubtedly is the reason employees have
been caught robo-signing thousands of foreclosure documents.8 2
Moreover, servicers stand to lose profit if foreclosures are drawn out."'
When problems arise with lost documents and the foreclosure process
is stalled, servicers are under pressure to clear the impediment that is
damaging their profit margin; thus, they will employ any means neces-
sary to prevent the hold up, including forging necessary documents
which is another symptom of robo-signing."
Until the cost created by robo-signing surpasses the potential for
profit created by quickly pushing through foreclosures using faulty
documents, servicers have little incentive to end the practice.8 5 Al-
78. See Andrew J. Kazakes, Comment, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure
Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Re-
sponses, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1383, 1416 (2010). "[A] servicer's compensa-
tion comes from three primary sources": (1) "a base fee for servicing the
loan [,] . . . [and they] are compensated at twice this rate to service loans in
default"; (2) "interest earned on payments prior to disbursement to inves-
tors"; and (3) "any fees collected, including late payment fees and fees asso-
ciated with default." (footnote omitted). Id. at 1404.
79. Id. at 1405.
80. Id.
81. See Kazakes, supra note 78, at 1403-04 (explaining that the structure of the
mortgage industry places the best interest of servicers and investors in
conflict).
82. See Gutman, supra note 6 ("[A] Florida ... robo-signer ... somehow man-
aged to vet 150,000 mortgages in three years. If she worked every day of
every year, that would amount to over 130 mortgages a day.").
83. See Kazakes, supra note 78, at 1405. As mortgage servicers must generally
"front legal fees and borrower payments to investors" when borrowers enter
default, servicers are incentivized to move through the foreclosure process
quickly, because "the servicer recoups fees and cash outlays immediately"
with a foreclosure sale. Kazakes, supra note 78, at 1405.55
84. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Probe Targets Foreclosure Paperwork, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB00014240527487041640045
75548580189204898.html ("The Florida attorney general's office is looking
at possible use of 'fabricated documents' used in foreclosure actions in
court.").
85. In response to these concerns, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") adopted a new rule aimed at reducing servicer incentive to robo-
sign, by eliminating "the obligation for servicers to continue funding pay-
ments missed by borrowers . .. [by] strictly limit[ing] advances to just three
payments unless there is a way to repay the servicer that does not rely on
foreclosure." Kerry Curry, Hb)IC's Blair say Robo-Signing Points to Incentives Is-
sue in Mortgage Servicing, HousINcWIRE (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.hous-
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though the current backlog in foreclosures may achieve this effect in
the short term," for it to continue into the long-term, mortgage ser-
vicers must be held accountable by both the government8 7 and
investors.
C. A Lack of Personal Responsibility on the Part of Individual Actors
Another factor that contributed to robo-signing, and thus pointed
out the shortcomings in a policy of expediting foreclosure proceed-
ings, is the lack of personal responsibility on the part of individuals
working within mortgage servicing firms. In early 2011, testimony by
one of the most notorious robo-signers, Jeffrey Stephan, led to Ally
Financial postponing around 250 Maryland foreclosures." The
court's traditional reliance on the validity of affidavits attested to by
individuals, such as Jeffrey Stephan, shows that a policy of expediting
foreclosure proceedings relies too greatly on the honesty of individual
actors. While Stephan never received a sanction for his fraudulent
signing of the affidavits in question,o "federal and state officials are
seeking penalties of $20 billion to $25 billion from . .. financial firms
under investigation" in connection with the "robo-signing" crisis." In
ingwire.com/2010/10/13/fdics-bair-says-robo-signing-points-to-incentives-
issue-in-mortgage-servicing (statement of FDIC Chairman Sheila Blair).
However, this rule is limited to banks. Id.
86. Since mortgage servicers must front legal fees for investors, they are cur-
rently losing profits while the foreclosure system is backed up. Id. How-
ever, in the long run, servicers will still be incentivized to "cut corners"
again unless investors hold them accountable. See Levy, supra note 1.
87. See Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption,
and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REv. 171, 173-
74 (2011) ("[T]hrough the dearth of effective federal regulation, mortgage
servicers have been acting as a law unto themselves, to the detriment of
both the borrowers they collect from and the investors whom they are sup-
posed to serve.").
88. Investors recently sued Wells-Fargo executives for failing "to promptly ad-
dress robo-signing and documentation issues tied to the mortgage securi-
tization process, resulting in a situation where 'liabilities appear to be
hanging like the sword of Damocles over Wells Fargo and its sharehold-
ers.' Kerry Panchuk, Pension Funds Sue Wells Fargo, Alleging Executives
Breached Fiduciary Duties, HOUSINGWIRE, June 22, 2011, http://www.housing
wire.com/2011/06/22/pension-funds-sue-wells-fargo-alleging-executives-
breached-fiduciary-duties.
89. Dina ElBoghdady & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Ally Financial to withdraw Mary-
land foreclosures signed by Jeffrey Stephan, WASH. PosT (Jan. 19, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/18/AR2011
01 1806433.html?wpisrc=nl headline.
90. However, Jeffrey Stephan has been sanctioned for robo-signing in Florida.
See Deutsch Bank Trust Co. v. Cumbess, Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida,
Marion County, case no. 2008-CA-002663 (order dated Mar. 9, 2011),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/50884586/Motion-for-Relief-
GRANTED-Attorney-s-Fees-Awarded-on-Affidavit-Made-in-Bad-Faith.
91. Ruth Simon, Vanessa O'Connell & Nick Timiraos, Foreclosure Talks Snag on
Bank Liability, WALL ST.J., Aug. 22, 2011, at Cl, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904070604576521282894534152.html.
2011] "Robo-Signing" 93
order to create an environment of accountability within the mortgage
servicing industry, individual decision-makers must be held accounta-
ble. Placing some responsibility for cursory and deliberately fraudu-
lent practices on individuals working within mortgage servicing firms
would likely translate into added diligence in handling documents
and greater emphasis on following proper procedures. 92
Recently, the New York Supreme Court for Kings County,
threatened HSBC Bank USA President and CEO Irene M. Dorner
with sanctions stemming from a foreclosure action in which, after sub-
mitting an affidavit attesting to the validity of the foreclosure docu-
ments, the documents were found to contain "false statements of
[material] facts, [coupled with] the use of robo-signers."" In doing
so, Justice Schack explained that Dorner "bears a measure of responsi-
bility for [the] plaintiffs actions," due to her "particular knowledge of
HSBC Bank USA's operations."" The Maryland judiciary should fol-
low a similar course, as a means of putting the pressure on decision-
makers to ensure that their processes are in compliance with the law.
In order to effectively increase individual accountability, Maryland's
legislature must also take part in the process by enacting legislation
increasing the penalties for submitting fraudulent affidavits. In Ne-
vada, for example, a recently enacted bill will increase civil and crimi-
nal penalties associated with robo-signing." The bill requires
foreclosing parties to not only submit an affidavit attesting to the valid-
ity of the foreclosure documents, but also provides for a civil action
against individuals who foreclose under power of sale clauses without
complying with the relevant statutory provisions." Furthermore, the
bill makes the crime of "making a false representation concerning ti-
tle" a felony.97 If Maryland enacted a similar statute, it would place
significantly greater pressure on individual actors to comply with rele-
vant regulations when attesting to the validity of affidavits in Maryland
foreclosure cases.
CONCLUSION
The current robo-signing crisis is the result of a severe lack of effec-
tive regulation and an industrial culture focused on pushing the limit
in terms of expediency in order to maximize profits, both of which
can be seen as pointing out the shortcomings in maintaining a policy
92. See Conlin, supra note 5 ("So far, no individuals, lenders or paperwork
processors have been charged with a crime over the robo-signed signatures
found on documents last year.").
93. HSBC Bank USA v. Taher, No. 9320/09, 2011WL 2610525, at *1, *15 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. July 1, 2011).
94. Id. at *17.
95. SeeAssemb. B. No. 284, 76th Gen. Assemb. (Nev. 2011).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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of expediting mortgage proceedings." The increase in efficiency
gained by an expedient foreclosure process is simply not worth the
sacrifice of individuals' procedural rights. By increasing judicial over-
sight of the foreclosure process, reorganizing the servicing industry to
reduce incentives to robo-sign, and emphasizing individual accounta-
bility, it may be possible to salvage the mortgagor/mortgagee
relationship.
98. See Eggert, supra note 87, at 184 ("For too long, mortgage servicing has
been relatively unregulated[;] . . . [flederal regulation of mortgage servic-
ing has been, in the words of the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
'limited and fragmented."'). See also discussion supra Section II.B.
